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解释的规则、DSU 条文以及 WTO 的性质，得出结论认为上诉机构的解释在 WTO 的
规则体系内不存在合法性基础。分析指出该解释体现出急于根据目的解释方法进
行扩张解释的倾向，与 DSU 具体条文及其体现出来的宗旨相矛盾，也与 WTO 作为
主权国家间国际组织的性质不相符。因此，上诉机构的做法超出了 DSU 授予它的
权限范围，在 WTO 体系内找不到合法性依据。 
第三章通过分析上诉机构的解释对 WTO 体系造成的损害，阐明解决法庭之友
问题的必要性，并进一步分析其解决途径以及我国应采取的对策。分析认为能否













内 容 摘 要 
 
此，在 WTO 体系中只有代表成员方意志的部长级会议和总理事会才有权界定法庭
之友在 WTO 争端解决机制中的地位并制定相关的规则。 
 






























The Amicus Curiae originated from Roman law, and it supported the 
court as a neutral party at that time. Becoming a common practice, it moved 
from “the friend of court” to “friend of the party” to “friend of the 
lobbyist”. In the United States, under the principle of “judicial economy” 
the Supreme Court adopted a set of rules on submission of Amicus Curiae 
briefs. The experience of the United States influenced the WTO dispute 
settlement system when the issue of the Amicus Curiae briefs is 
concerning. 
Besides the preface and the conclusion, the main body of the thesis 
divides into three parts. 
Chapter one introduces the history of the Amicus Curiae and the 
experience of the Amicus Curiae in the WTO system and the rules guiding 
the Amicus participation developed by the Appellate Body through three 
key cases. The Appellate Body decided first from the US-Shrimp case then 
the US-hot-rolled steel case that it, along with the Panel has the 
authority to accept and consider unsolicited briefs submitted by the 
Amicus. In EC-asbestos case, regardless of the oppositions of most members, 
the Appellate Body took a further action to develop an “additional 
procedure” to invite non-governmental organizations to submit briefs. The 
actions of the Appellate Body upset and outraged most WTO members. At the 
request of Egypt, the WTO General Council held a special session in 2000 
to discuss the issue of Amicus Curiae briefs. With the exception to the 
United States, which took the view that the Appellate Body had the 
authority under DSU to allow Amicus participation, most WTO member 
delegations were highly critical of the Appellate Body’s actions. The 















Body’s authority and it was a matter for the members to settle. 
Chapter two carries out a research on the legitimacy of the 
interpretation of the Appellate Body about the Amicus Curiae briefs. 
Analyzing through the rule of interpretation under DSU and the specific 
language under DSU and the nature of the WTO, comes the conclusion that 
the interpretation and actions of the Appellate Body have no legal ground 
in the WTO rule system. The analysis tells that the interpretation of the 
Appellate Body showed the incline of expansive interpretation, 
contradicted with the specific language under DSU and the purpose of DSU, 
and infringed the inter-governmental organization of WTO. And the actions 
of the Appellate Body go beyond its authority and are groundless in the 
WTO legal system.  
Chapter three presents the necessity to solve the problem of Amicus 
participation in the WTO dispute settlement system through the analysis 
of the infringement caused by the interpretation of the Appellate Body 
to the WTO system. Then discusses the means to solve the problem and the 
measures China should take to deal with it. The analysis takes the view 
that WTO members alone have the authority to decide whether the Amicus 
Curiae is allowed to participate in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
In the WTO system, the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, 
which represent the interest of WTO members, have the authority to define 
the role of the Amicus Curiae in the WTO dispute settlement system and 
adopt relative guiding rules. 
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前  言 
 
随着经济全球化的发展，世界经济的互相依赖性越来越强。世界贸易组织
（World Trade Organization,以下简称 WTO）作为一个多边的贸易机制，承载
着促进世界贸易发展的历史使命，在国际社会中发挥着越来越重要的作用。WTO
争端解决机构(The Dispute Settlement Body,以下简称 DSB)是根据乌拉圭回合
中达成的《关于争端处理规则与程序的谅解书》（Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes，以下简称 DSU）为管理





































第一章  WTO 争端解决机制中法庭之友的实践 
 




















关系而仅有政治利害关系的第三方对诉讼的干预，直到 1821 年的 Green v. 
Briddle 案件才为法庭之友敞开了大门，该案中 Henry Clay 作为法庭之友代表
Kentucky 的利益（非诉讼当事方）被联邦最高法院允许出庭，并代表 Kentucky
                   
① JARED,B.CAWLEY.Friend of the Court:How the WTO Justice the Acceptance of the Amicus Curiae Brief from 
Non-Governmental Organizations[J].Penn State International Law Review,summer 2004. 
② PADIDEH,ALA’I.Judicial Lobbying at the WTO:the Debate over the Use of Amicus Curiae Briefs and the US 
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